It is well known that Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games are interchangeable and equivalent. We show that the same properties also hold for the weak saddle, a set-valued and ordinal solution concept proposed by Lloyd Shapley in the 1950s.
It is well known that Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games are interchangeable and equivalent. We show that the same properties also hold for the weak saddle, a set-valued and ordinal solution concept proposed by Lloyd Shapley in the 1950s.
Consider a zero-sum game represented by a matrix A. The set R of rows represents the row player's actions, and the set C of columns represents the column player's actions. If the row player chooses action r ∈ R, and the column player chooses action c ∈ C, then the payoff of the row player is given by the entry u(r, c) ∶= A r,c of the matrix, while the payoff of the column player is given by the negative −A r,c .
A set R 1 of rows is said to (weakly) dominate a set R 2 of rows with respect to a set C of columns if for all rows r 2 ∈ R 2 , there exists a row r 1 ∈ R 1 such that u(r 1 , c) ≥ u(r 2 , c) for all c ∈ C. Similarly, a set C 1 of columns is said to (weakly) dominate a set C 2 of columns if for all columns c 2 ∈ C 2 , there exists a column c 1 ∈ C 1 such that u(r, c 1 ) ≤ u(r, c 2 ) for all r ∈ R. Given subsets R 1 ⊆ R 2 ⊆ R of rows and subsets C 1 ⊆ C 2 ⊆ C of columns, the product R 1 × C 1 is said to be a externally stable in R 2 × C 2 if R 1 dominates R 2 R 1 with respect to C 1 , and C 1 dominates C 2 C 1 with respect to R 1 . The product R 1 × C 1 is said to be a (weak) saddle in R 2 × C 2 if it is externally stable in R 2 × C 2 and no proper subset of it is externally stable in R 2 × C 2 (Shapley, 1953a (Shapley, ,b, 1964 .
As an example, one can check that for the matrix
the four 2 × 2 matrices at the corners are saddles.
Ordinal Minimax Theorem
We begin with two lemmata.
The proof of Lemma 1 is left as an exercise to the reader.
Proof. The "only if" part follows from Lemma 1. For the "if" part, suppose that R 1 ×C 1 is externally stable in R 2 × C 2 . We will show that R 1 dominates R 3 R 1 with respect to C 1 ; the argument for column domination is similar. Consider an arbitrary row r ∈ R 3 R 1 . If r ∈ R 2 R 1 , then since R 1 × C 1 is externally stable in R 2 × C 2 , there exists a row r ′ ∈ R 1 such that r ′ dominates r with respect to C 1 . Otherwise, we have r ∈ R 3 R 2 . Since R 2 × C 2 is externally stable in R 3 × C 3 , there exists a row r ′ ∈ R 2 such that r ′ dominates r with respect to C 2 , and in particular with respect to C 1 . But since R 1 ×C 1 is externally stable in R 2 × C 2 , there exists a row r ′′ ∈ R 1 such that r ′′ dominates r ′ with respect to C 1 . It follows that r ′′ ∈ R 1 dominates r with respect to C 1 , and hence R 1 dominates R 3 R 1 .
We now come to our main theorem.
Theorem 1. Let R 1 × C 1 and R 2 × C 2 be saddles in R × C. Then the following are true:
1. (interchangeability) The products R 1 × C 2 and R 2 × C 1 are also saddles in R × C.
(equivalence)
The product R 2 × C 2 can be derived from R 1 × C 1 by permuting the rows and columns. In particular, R 1 = R 2 and C 1 = C 2 , and the multisets of entries of R 1 × C 1 and R 2 × C 2 are the same.
Proof. Suppose that R 1 × C 1 and R 2 × C 2 are saddles in R × C, with R 1 = p 1 , R 2 = p 2 , C 1 = q 1 , and C 2 = q 2 . Since R 1 × C 1 is externally stable in R × C, each row r 2 ∈ R 2 is dominated by some row
Suppose that f 1 , f 2 , g 1 , and g 2 are all bijections (which in particular implies that p 1 = p 2 and q 1 = q 2 .) Then the rows in R 2 × C 1 are dominated by the rows in R 1 × C 1 , one by one. Hence sum(
and sum(R 1 × C 2 ) ≥ sum(R 1 × C 1 ). It follows that equality holds everywhere, and hence R 2 × C 2 can be derived from R 1 × C 1 by permuting the rows and columns. Moreover, R 1 ×C 2 and R 2 ×C 1 can also be derived from R 1 ×C 1 by permuting the rows and columns, and one can check that they are saddles in R × C as well.
Suppose now that at least one of f 1 , f 2 , g 1 , and g 2 is not a bijection. Then at least one of them is not a surjection. Indeed, if for instance p 1 < p 2 , then f 2 is not a surjection. If p 1 = p 2 and q 1 = q 2 , and any of the functions f 1 , f 2 , g 1 , g 2 is not a bijection, then it is also not a surjection. Assume without loss of generality that f 1 is not a surjection. It suffices to show that R 1 × C 1 is not inclusion-minimal, i.e., there exists a proper subset
We abuse notation and write
]. If f −1 2 (i) = ∅ for some i, the inequality is meaningless for that index i and we may remove the index from consideration. A similar statement holds for g 2 . We may relabel the remaining indices as 1, . . . , p 3 and 1, . . . , q 3 , respectively, so that
Since f 1 is not surjective, we have that S is a proper subset of R 1 × C 1 . Hence it suffices to show that there exists a subset of S that is externally stable in R 1 × C 1 .
We define a directed graph G R as follows. The nodes of G R are given by 1, 2, . . . , p 3 . If f 1 (i) ∈ f −1 2 (j), then we include a directed edge from j to i. Let S R be the set of nodes in G R that belong to a directed cycle. (A self-loop counts as a directed cycle.) One can check that each node in G R has exactly one incoming edge, and any node in G R can be reached from a node in S R . Similarly, we define a directed graph G C with nodes 1, 2, . . . , q 3 . If g 1 (i) ∈ g −1 2 (j), then we include a directed edge from i to j. One can check that each node in G C has exactly one outgoing edge, and any node in G C can reach a node in S C , where S C is the set of nodes in G C that belong to a directed cycle.
Suppose that G R contains an edge i 2 → i 1 and G C contains an edge j 1 → j 2 . Then
. Since x f 1 (i 1 ),g 1 (j 1 ) belongs to both x f 1 (i 1 ),g −1 2 (j 2 ) and x f −1 2 (i 2 ),g 1 (j 1 ) , we have x f −1 2 (i 1 ),g 1 (j 2 ) ≤ x f 1 (i 1 ),g 1 (j 1 ) ≤ x f 1 (i 2 ),g −1 2 (j 1 ) . In particular, we have
Applying the same argument as in the n = 2 case repeatedly, we have x f −1 2 (i 1 ),g 1 (jn) ≤ x f 1 (in),g −1 2 (j 1 ) . We claim that S ′ ∶= ⋃ i∈S R f 1 (i) × ⋃ j∈S C g 1 (j) ⊆ S is externally stable in R 1 × C 1 . To prove the claim, it suffices to consider row domination; column domination follows similarly.
For each node x ∈ S C , define c(x) to be the (unique) node in S C such that the edge x → c(x) exists. We must show that for any i ∈ [p 1 ], there exists j ∈ S R such that
we only need to show that for any i ∈ [p 3 ], there exists j ∈ S R such that x f 1 (j),g −1 2 (c(k)) ≥ x f −1 2 (i),g 1 (k) for all k ∈ S C . Let M denote the least common multiple of all the cycle lengths in S C . For any positive integer n and any node k ∈ S C , there exists a path of length nM − 1 in S C (and hence in G C ) that begins with c(k) and ends with k. Since every node in G R has one incoming edge, for large enough n ′ there exists a path of length n ′ in G R that begins with some node j ∈ S R and ends with i. Taking n ′′ = nM − 1 for large enough n, there exists a path of length n ′′ in G C that begins with c(k) and ends with k, and a path of length n ′′ in G R that begins with j ∈ S R and ends with i. It follows that x f 1 (j),g −1 2 (c(k)) ≥ x f −1 2 (i),g 1 (k) , thus completing the proof.
Internal Stability
Given a subset R 1 ⊆ R of rows and a subset C 1 ⊆ C of columns, the product R 1 × C 1 is said to be internally stable if for any row r ∈ R 1 , the set of rows R 1 {r} does not dominate r with respect to C 1 , and for any column c ∈ C 1 , the set of columns C 1 {c} does not dominate c with respect to R 1 .
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that R 1 × C 1 is not internally stable. Then there exists either a row r ∈ R 1 such that R 1 {r} dominates r with respect to C 1 , or a column c ∈ C 1 such that C 1 {c} dominates c with respect to R 1 . One can check that (R 1 {r}) × C 1 is externally stable in the former case, and R 1 × (C 1 {c}) is externally stable in the latter case, yielding the desired contradiction.
Remark 2. Given subsets R 1 , R 2 ⊆ R and C 1 , C 2 ⊆ C such that R 1 × C 1 and R 2 × C 2 are externally stable in R × C and internally stable, it is not necessary that R 1 × C 1 and R 2 × C 2 have the same dimension. Indeed, consider the matrix
One can check that the set {0} at the top-left corner and the matrix A itself are externally stable in A and internally stable.
Remark 3. The same example shows that interchangeability and equivalence do not hold for mixed (weak) saddles.
Consequences
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Theorem 1. It also follows from Shapley's proof that strict saddles are unique, since strict saddles and weak saddles are equivalent in this setting.
Corollary 1. Every game whose matrix contains pairwise distinct numbers in each row and column has a unique weak saddle.
Proof. Suppose that the game as two distinct weak saddles, R 1 × C 1 and R 2 × C 2 , and assume without loss of generality that C 1 ≠ C 2 . From Theorem 1, we have that R 1 × C 2 is also a weak saddle. Since the numbers in each row are pairwise distinct, however, C 1 and C 2 must coincide, a contradiction.
A confrontation game is represented by a skew-symmetric matrix A in which zeros appear only on the main diagonal. Given a set R of rows and a set C of columns of the skew-symmetric matrix A, the product R × C is called symmetric if the rows and the columns are chosen from corresponding positions in the matrix. A saddle R × C is called a symmetric saddle if the product R × C is symmetric. We have the following lemma, the proof of which we leave as an exercise to the reader. It is known from Duggan and Le Breton (1996) that confrontation games have a unique weak saddle. This also follows as a consequence of Theorem 1.
Corollary 2. Every confrontation game has a unique weak saddle.
Proof. Suppose that the confrontation game given by a matrix A has two distinct (weak) saddles, R 1 × C 1 and R 2 × C 2 . We have that the matrix A is symmetric and contains zeroes only on the main diagonal. We consider the following two cases.
Case 1 : At least one of the two saddles is not symmetric. Assume without loss of generality that R 1 × C 1 is not symmetric. Let C ′ 1 be the set of columns corresponding to the rows in R 1 , and let R ′ 1 be the set of rows corresponding to the columns in C 1 . Since A is symmetric, we have that R ′ 1 × C ′ 1 is also a saddle. By Theorem 1, we have that R 1 × C ′ 1 is a symmetric saddle. Lemma 3 implies that R 1 × C ′ 1 contains exactly one zero in each row and each column, while R 1 × C 1 does not. But this contradicts Theorem 1.
Case 2 : Both saddles are symmetric. Then R 1 × C 2 is an asymmetric saddle, and we obtain a contradiction in the same way as in Case 1.
Even though the multisets of entries in any two weak saddles are the same, the sets of strategies of the two players in a saddle need not coincide. Consider the following matrix A = 0 1 2 2 1 0 .
The unique weak saddle of the matrix A is A itself. The set of strategies for the row player in this saddle is {{0, 1, 2}, {2, 1, 0}}, while the set of strategies for the column player is {{0, −2}, {−1, −1}, {−2, 0}}. In fact, the saddle is even non-rectangular. Nevertheless, if the game is a symmetric zero-sum game, the sets of strategies for both players coincide. To this end, we only need to show the existence of a symmetric saddle. But as in Case 1 of the proof of Corollary 2, the existence of an asymmetric saddle yields the existence of a symmetric saddle.
